President Obama's Entreaty to Israel

Many things have been said and written about the presidency of Barack Obama since his inauguration on a cold day in January 2009, and probably all of these have been disputed by one commentator or another. However, there is one facet of his half-term in office with which one would be very hard-pressed to disagree: Obama goes big. True, there will always be a significant cadre of leftwingers who say he doesn't go big enough, from Krugmanites who said he should have pushed early and often for a bigger stimulus to the single-payer advocates who wanted him to go full-throttle for (at least) the public option in the slog to health-care reform to the liberal Democrats who said the financial regulatory reform bill was "simply not enough." Despite these often-voiced complaints, even the most radical members of both parties could probably agree that Obama at least aims high, even if his cross-hairs inevitably get pulled down, for better or worse, by a short-sighted Republican party furiously employing the 60-vote requirement in the Senate.

Domestic policy work aside, there are two disparate yet possibly related areas in which Obama has clearly made an effort to go big, in lieu of not going at all: the 2008 presidential campaign and his administration's current policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Anyone paying even a modicum of attention to the primary battle between Obama and then-Senator Hillary Clinton will recall the political fiasco surrounding the sermons of Obama's pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, and the way in which those videos enforced a swath of perceptions about Candidate Obama. Rather than take the John Kerry approach and steadfastly believe that ignoring the problem would make it go away (see Truth, Swift Boat Veterans for), Obama opted to swing for the fences and met the controversy head-on with a much-hyped speech in Philadelphia. While the speech did not make the problem go away entirely in the campaign, it was eventually lauded for effectively neutralizing the issue in the primary and reducing its impact in the general election.

The Obama administration's role thus far in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been similarly high-intentioned, but with significantly (and regrettably) lower-minded results. While Obama originally aimed to have a peace agreement in place within one year of the commencement of negotiations, that vision now appears in the minds of virtually everyone involved (except the administration) to be nothing more than a pipe dream. The diagnoses for the perceived paralysis of the talks are as varied as the commentators issuing said diagnoses, but there is one symptom in particular that seems ideally suited for the skills Obama demonstrated in the campaign (and have since been conspicuously absent from his governing style): the lack of public and governmental support in Israel for Obama and his approach to the conflict. If the polls are to be believed, most Israelis think Obama is working primarily in the interests of the Palestinians and that this position automatically puts him at odds with the interests of Israel. According to POLITICO's Ben Smith, Obama has "resisted advisers’ suggestions that he travel to Israel or speak directly to Israelis as he has to Muslims in Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia." This makes no sense from either a policy or a public-relations standpoint. If Israeli support for Obama's initiatives is so anemic, he would do well to employ his greatest political weapon (his ability to deliver one helluva speech) in an attempt to combat this problem.

As for what such a speech would say, that would probably be the easiest part. The speech would first assert that it is each nation's first and foremost responsibility to look out for the interests and security of its citizens, and that Israel has, with better and more immediate reason than most, been unflinchingly consistent in taking on this responsibility. The speech would concede that America must also work in favor of its own interests, but also point out that the interests of other nations, especially those of its allies, and more especially those of Israel, frequently overlap with its own. The speech would take a lofty turn towards the idea that, whereas conflict and aggression usually end up serving the interests of only one group or people, peace and coexistence can be beneficial to all (Obama would do well here to point out that these words are intended for the Palestinians as well). 

It is in this light that the speech would spell out exactly why peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians is in the highest interest of Israel, and by extension of America: it would remove the Palestinian issue as a rhetorical weapon from the salvos of Israel's detractors in the Arab world; it would give political cover to Israel's more moderate neighbors, such as Jordan and Egypt, for establishing closer ties with Israel fueled by their own economic interests. From a security standpoint, it would drastically reduce the likelihood of suicide-bombers or rocket attacks from the Palestinians, and would provide Israel with vastly broader support in combating any factions (such as Hamas) that might engage in such tactics. And perhaps most significantly, it would help line up international (and Arab) support for Israel should it be forced to take serious military action against Iran's nuclear weapons program. 

An oratorically-persuasive speech of this nature, clearly spelling out the fact that America's (and Obama's) goals in this process are to further the interests of the Israelis, would probably not win over a portion of the Israeli public or government sufficient enough to set the stage for a completed peace deal. But at the very least, it would be a valiant attempt at showing the Israelis what Obama is really aiming for, and why it is in their interest to help him achieve it.

State of the Union: What Does It All Mean?

The 2010 midterm elections have come and gone, and so begins the time-honored tradition of political observers of all stripes making an attempt at interpreting what exactly the results will mean for the government and, ultimately, the country. I find myself unable to resist engaging in said tradition; thus follows my own view of what the election means and what might happen going forward.

Before one makes that attempt, however, it is important to try to understand the general meaning of elections in this country. Structurally, elections are the point of contact between the people and the government that obviously has the most influence, and thus the most significant ramifications. Other lines of communication, such as letters and phone calls to your Congressman or Senators, pale in their impact on government policy in comparison to voters exercising their franchise, as this most recent election has clearly demonstrated. Given this point, there are several questions that should first be asked before one attempts this interpretive exercise.

To start, one must evaluate whether or not the electorate was determined to use that influence to send an explicit and mostly uniform message to those that govern it, or if voters were simply all over the place in their agenda. I think it is plain for all to see that Americans were largely aligned in their feelings about their own situations and the country in general, in that they see an economy sputtering through a so-called recovery, they see themselves and everyone they know struggling to make ends meet and to figure out the road forward, and, most importantly, they don't see the government doing anything that is explicitly designed to help them out. Now, there are plenty of folks, including many who were just voted into office, who will say this election was a rebuke of Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi, of the Democrats' Big-Government Agenda, of Out-Of-Control Spending and Taxes, of any number of things. These same people were probably saying over the last year and a half that Obama over-interpreted the voters' message from 2008 and pulled the country in an uncomfortably left-wing direction, and perhaps they're right; anyone who considers himself affiliated with the Tea Party, whether politician or voter, would certainly agree. But what about the broader electorate? Even in blood-red-conservative states like Texas and Oklahoma, only 1 in 3 voters identify with the Tea Party movement, so it would be rather disingenuous to try and pass this message off as that of the much larger bloc of less partisan voters. If I may speculate, I would say that most voters probably couldn't care less about what goes on in Washington if the states of their households were more on the level. But in times of economic upheaval, it only makes sense that the voting public would send the message that whatever the politicians are doing is not working to improve their quality of life, and thus they decide to give someone else a try. Trying to tackle issues of behemoth proportions like healthcare and energy are important, and would maybe even play well with voters under normal economic conditions, but Americans are, justifiably, too concerned with their wallets and retirement funds to believe that those issues are more important than bringing down unemployment.

So if the message voters are sending to Washington is one of frustration with their own economic situations and apprehension about the future of the economy, the second question one must ask is: what do the voters want the new office-holders to do about it? Just as Democrats over-interpreted the voters' message in 2008 (or perhaps miscalculated their response to that message), so must the new political order take care to avoid doing the same. If the Republican majority in the House makes it a top priority to repeal the new healthcare law (which is all but guaranteed not to happen with Obama wielding the veto pen), do they really think this is going to endear them to the broader electorate, outside the Tea Party folks?  Will proposals to prevent "anchor babies" from gaining citizenship do anything to reduce unemployment? Unlikely. Therefore, wouldn't it serve them better to pursue legislation that puts job creation and economic growth at the top of the list, rather than undoing the (granted, decidedly liberal) legislation passed during the first two years of Obama's presidency?

Which brings me to the third question: what should the President and (the remaining) Congressional Democrats do, now that their ability to shape and pass legislation has been drastically reduced? The smart things would seem to be maintaining a laser-like focus on job creation and growth, then hammering the Republicans any time they get side-tracked from that (it would clearly have behooved Democrats to have done this from the start and tackled healthcare, etc. when the economy had gotten back on its feet, but what's done is done). Many Republicans, including soon-to-be-Speaker Boehner, have stated publicly that there are certain issues on which they will absolutely refuse to compromise. If Obama proposes any job-creation legislation that incurs new spending and/or raised taxes (of any kind), presumably those Republicans would keep that promise. Therefore, if the Democrats can push job-creation legislation that is deficit-neutral and only raises taxes by, say, eliminating corporate tax loopholes or increasing oil/excise/plastic surgery taxes, a lack of any nascent job creation can be hung effectively and genuinely on the Republicans.

I have maintained since January 20th, 2009 that Obama's reelection chances are better than even. I also think they will continue to march higher and higher as the 112th Congress goes about its business.